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ARGUMENT 
ROA'S ISSUE 1: THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER 
THE ISSUES RAISED IN APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF. 
ROA argues Garco did not identify the Court's December 29, 1997 Order in its Notice of 
Appeal, and that this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider that Order. ROA implies as a 
corollary that this Court should not consider issues addressed by the trial court's May 1, 1998 
Order, if those issues were also addressed in the December 29, 1997 Order. The real question 
ROA poses is not this Court's jurisdiction over specific issues, but the standard of review to be 
applied to those issues. ROA fails to completely state the applicable standard of review: 
We review the trial court's denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment 
under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion. 
Timmv. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). In reviewing such a motion, 
we accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law but review them for 
correctness. 
Lund v. Hall 938 P.2d 285, 296 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added). Even under an "abuse of 
discretion" standard, the question remains whether the trial court's conclusions of law were correct. 
See Timmv. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1388 (Utah 1996) ("[The] trial court abused its discretion 
in denying Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider the summary judgment due to the trial court's 
legal error ...") Under Lund and Timm, if the trial court committed a legal error in granting ROA 
summary judgment, when given the opportunity to correct its error, the trial court compounded that 
error and abused its discretion in denying Garco's "Motion to Revise." 1 
ROA concedes a trial court can revise a non-final order to correct its own errors or 
to reconsider issues inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court, Trembly v. Mrs. 
Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App. 1994). 
ROA takes an unduly restrictive view regarding the scope of the Order from which Garco 
appealed, and misunderstands the nature of the relief Garco seeks on appeal. A review of the 
procedural history is in order. ROA filed its motion for summary judgment on August 8, 1997 and 
obtained a November 24, 1997 hearing date. On November 17, 1997 Garco filed its own cross 
motion for summary judgment, and made a proper request under Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration for oral argument on Garco's motion, "at the same time as any hearing 
on ROA's motion." [R 398 (App. 9)] Despite Garco's request for a joint hearing, the trial court 
went forward with the November 24, 1997 hearing on ROA's motion alone. At that hearing, 
counsel for ROA pointed out: 
Your Honor, we're not here on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. That was 
actually filed last Monday and we haven't had an opportunity to respond to that 
motion. Counsel has made reference to affidavits that have been filed in support of 
that motion and to the arguments that he has made in this particular motion. The 
affidavits, those affidavits, there are many facts that we do in fact dispute. [R 538 
(hearing transcript p. 14)] 
The trial court should have continued the hearing. Instead, without having read Garco's 
motion, and in the face of ROA's contention Garco's affidavits raised genuine issues of material 
fact, the trial court nevertheless granted ROA's motion for summary judgment. The trial court 
acknowledged it was not ruling on Garco's motion, but ruled on how it would address that motion: 
I'm going to allow, as a response to your [Garco's motion for] summary judgment, 
simply a written statement that you [ROA] believe it's mooted and then of you 
[Garco] take the view that that isn't appropriate, then I think what you need to do 
is put in writing why you think a response is appropriate notwithstanding my ruling, 
and then I will either - I will either rule based on what both of you have said -
she can reply to what you said. In other words we can have a process here where 
Mrs. Frank can say I'm not going - I don't believe I should have to respond 
because it's all moot. If you take issue with that, then you can file an objection to 
that and say that she ought to respond and she can reply and I will either decide it 
on the papers or I';ll have you come in here for an argument. But one way or 
another, I want to give you a chance to contemplate, you know, whether or not she 
is right and it has been mooted out, or whatever position you want to take without 
having to decide it now. But if it doesn't look like there is any reason to continue 
the issue of your summary judgment after my ruling, why then it's a matter of 
getting a judgment entered and having your record and the purpose you want to use 
it for. Otherwise I will rule, and if I decide you're right, then I'll have Ms. Frank 
reply and we'll have an argument on your motion. [R 576-77 (hearing transcript 
p. 52-53)] 
After hearing further proposals by counsel, the trial court added to the procedure to be followed: 
I think what you need to do is take a look at what I said about it - I haven't read 
your TGarco's] motion because it's not before me today - and decide whether you 
really think you have got something to sav that would convince me that you - that 
the flip side is not true, that there are issues of fact in your motion as well as her 
motion I could rule on. But be that as it may, I think it is important that we, both 
sides, be given a chance to think about where everything stands in this case after my 
ruling and see how much more you want to do in this case. ... Anyway, let's go 
ahead on that basis. Prepare your [ROA's] ruling and then I think you need to 
decide if you're going to proceed on a counterclaim and then you need to decide, if 
she is, whether you [Garco] really think you have a shot at summary judgment after 
I rule. If you think you do, some distinguishable issue I have already ruled on, you 
certainly have a right to have that heard and ruled on. [R 579-580 (hearing 
transcript p. 55-56)] 
The parties left the hearing subject to the above ruling. The trial court specifically ruled 
that Garco, after the grant of summary judgment for ROA, could argue anew issues raised by either 
Garco's motion or ROA's motion, and that Garco had a right to a hearing and to a ruling on the 
merits as to those arguments. 
ROA did not respond with an argument Garco's motion for summary judgment was moot. 
Garco filed its '"Motion to Revise Order," which regardless of its title, in substance responded as 
allowed by the Court's ruling. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 fn2 
(substance, not caption, of a motion is dispositive in determining the character of the motion). 
Garco asked the Court both to "revise its Order to accurately reflect the facts and controlling law 
as set forth above (in Garco's opening memorandum)," and to "rule on Garco's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and/or require a trial on Garco's claims before entering any final order on 
those claims." [R 448 (App. 15)] Those were the issues as to which the trial court, in the 
November 24, 1997 hearing, had ruled Garco was entitled to a hearing and decision on the merits. 
In support of its motion, Garco incorporated all arguments it raised in the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment: 
Garco incorporates here by reference its November 17, 1997 Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ... [R 442 (App. 15)] 
This includes the law in Garco's Memoranda on the cross motions for summary 
judgment, for brevity's sake incorporated here by reference. [R 443 (App. 15)] 
Garco thus raised in its "Motion to Revise" all issues it had earlier raised in the parties' 
cross motions for summary judgment. Because of the trial court's November 24, 1997 ruling ("If 
you think you do, some distinguishable issue I have already ruled on, you certainly have a right to 
have that heard and ruled on"), the trial court had an affirmative duty to decide on the merits the 
issues arguments Garco raised. Garco's appeal "from the entire order" gives this Court jurisdiction 
to review all issues Garco raised in its "Motion to Revise", which include but are not limited to all 
issues raised on both motions for summary judgment. Since those issues turn on questions of law, 
not fact, the standard of review as to all issues is a correction of errors standard. 
Garco's "Motion to Revise" was in substance more than just a request to revise the 
December 29, 1997 order. 2 When Garco filed that motion, the trial court had not yet read, much 
less ruled on, Garco's motion for partial summary judgment. Garco specifically asked the trial 
court to "rule on Garco's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." [R448 (App. 15)] The May 1, 
1998 Order simply states Garco's Motion "is denied." For the Order to be a final appealable order, 
it must, as Garco specifically requested, decide Garco's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the merits. On appeal, the question is therefore whether the trial court correctly construed all facts 
2
 Reviewing courts will analyze "motions for reconsideration" in accordance with their 
substance and purpose. Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah App. 
1995). In Davis, a motion to reconsider was treated as a Rule 59 motion requesting a new trial. 
In this case, Garco's request that the trial court rule on Garco's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, coming well after ROA's time to oppose that motion had run, was the equivalent of a 
Notice to Submit for Decision under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
and inferences (Drvsdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997); Krantz v. Holt, 819 
P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991)), and whether the trial court then correctly applied the law, in denying 
Garco's motion for partial summary judgment.3 Those are questions of law this Court reviews for 
correctness, if the answer to either question is no, the trial court committed reversible error. 
ROA'S ISSUE 2: GARCO'S MOTION TO REVISE 
ADDRESSED SEVERAL OF THE TREMBLY FACTORS. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED FOR FAILING TO 
CORRECT ITS EARLIER ERRORS. 
As ROA acknowledges, a trial court can consider many factors in a Rule 54(b) motion, 
including, but not limited to, whether 
(1) the matter is presented in a "different light" or under "different circumstances;" 
(2) there has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; 
(4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; 
(5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed 
when first contemplated by the court. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App. 1994). Garco's "Motion to 
Revise," and the relief requested in that motion, went beyond a mere request to revise. Garco met 
its burden. A trial court does not have "discretion" to commit errors of law. A trial court abuses 
its discretion if, given the opportunity, it refuses to correct its own legal errors. Lund, Timm, 
supra. The standard of review on the question whether the trial court committed a legal error is 
itself a correction of error standard. Since the trial court's errors were all legal errors subject to 
a correction of error standard, they should be reversed by this Court. 
1
 If the May 1, 1998 Order, as ROA argues, merely denied reconsideration of the 
December 29, 1997 Order, there has not yet been a final ruling on Garco's Cross Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, there is as yet no final order, and this Court's duty would be to remand for 
disposition of Garco's pending motion for partial summary judgment. 
B. GARCO 'OFFERED NEW EVIDENCE" AND PRESENTED MATTERS IN 
A DIFFERENT LIGHT. 
ROA confuses the "new evidence" factor under Trembly with the "newly discovered 
evidence" grounds for a new trial. Garco offered evidence without objection by ROA in support 
of Garco's motion for partial summary judgment. Although Garco requested a hearing where the 
trial court would review Garco's evidence before ruling on ROA's motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court made its ruling while openly admitting it had not even seen Garco's evidence. The 
situation is analogous, not to a request for a new trial, but to a trial court sua sponte excluding 
evidence offered by a party without objection, to the offering party's prejudice. Such conduct is 
leversible error. Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Utah App. 1998) ("Fundamental fairness 
requires that a party be permitted to introduce evidence to rebut inferences the jury can draw from 
the opposing party's evidence. In this case, such evidence was excluded. ... Even though evidence 
sufficient to support the verdict was presented at trial, had Astill's rebuttal evidence been admitted, 
a different result may well have been reached. As such, the error was prejudicial.") Council's 
commentary during oral argument merely brought to the trial court's attention "new evidence" it 
had not seen at the time of the trial court's ruling. That commentary serves not to justify but to 
condemn the trial court's decision not to read the affidavits before making its ruling. 
The trial court"s decision granting ROA summary judgment relied heavily on the terms of 
ROA's lease agreement. Garco's cross motion for partial summary judgment showed, as Garco's 
opposition to ROA's motion did not, that the agreement was unenforceable against Garco, or at 
least that fact issues existed that would require the trial court to deny ROA's motion. Garco's 
motion also argued, as Garco's opposition to ROA's motion did not, ROA's breach of an express 
agreement to remove its entire sign, and ROA's method of removal as act of waste. Those 
arguments put matters in a different light than appeared before. 
ROA's reliance on Board of Education of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983) is misplaced. Granite depended on interpretation of a statute allocating 
taxes between public entities. After the trial court construed the statute to favor one party, Granite 
changed its theory of from one in law to one in equity. Because the right to recovery was based 
on statute, "We hold that Granite's amendment . . . had no significant effect upon the issue of 
liability since that issue depended solely upon an interpretation of the statutes in question regardless 
of the basis of recovery." Id. at 1033. A comparison of Garco's memorandum opposing ROA's 
motion for summary judgment [App. 4] and Garco's memorandum supporting its cross motion 
[App. 10] shows the latter did not merely "rehash arguments" previously made, but in fact put the 
issues in a different light. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING ARGUMENTS IN GARCO'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM. 
In its Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Revise Order [R453 (App. 16)], ROA argued "one 
cannot commit trespass which one in lawful possession of the premises [App. 16 p. 4], and that 
"Having been authorized by the lease to change or remove the sign, Reagan did not commit waste 
by cutting it down" and "Reagan had no such duty under the terms of the lease." [App. 16 p. 5] 
ROA's arguments opened the door for Garco to rebut that if the lease was not binding on Garco, 
ROA could nof rely on the lease terms to justify its conduct. Garco's Reply Memorandum, Point 
1(B) properly rebutted ROA's argument by explaining how the lease was not binding on Garco. 
ROA's argued its June 12, 1995 letter was a contract modification lacking consideration. 
[App. 16 p. 4] ROA opened the door for Garco to rebut, as it did in its Point 1(D), that the letter 
was not a "modification" but clarified a contract ambiguity, and evidenced the parties' intent as to 
how and when the structure would be removed, and that ROA acted in violation of the agreement 
as mutually construed by the parties. 
ROA argued its only duties were duties at law arising from contract In particular, ROA 
argued it had no duty to refrain from committing waste [App 16 p 4, 5] Garco was entitled to 
raise as rebuttal arguments that ROA had other duties in addition to its contractual duties That was 
the gravamen of Garco's Point 1(E), which was proper rebuttal 
In opposing Garco's Motion to Revise ROA relied heavily on Wellesley Hills Realty Trust 
v Mobile Oil Corp , 747 F Supp 93 (D Mass 1990) In that case the Court found a valid claim 
under the state's Oil and Hazardous Material Release Act arising from Mobile's release of oil and 
other contaminants during its ownership of the property, but declined to recognize a claim by the 
new owner for trespass because "Mobile's releases of oil on its own land cannot constitute a 
trespass " Id at 99 ROA also argued the law of waste did not apply In effect, ROA argued, 
based on the law of other jurisdictions, that it should be the public policy of this state to allow 
ROA's conduct [App 16 p 4, 5] ROA again opened the dooi for Garco to argue in rebuttal what 
the public policy of this state is and should be Garco's Point 1(F) does just that As stated before, 
it also properly rebuts ROA's argument that none of the Trembly factors are present 
The trial court improperly struck Garco's Point II, as that point piopeily relied on Garco s 
other arguments the trial court also improperly struck 
ROA'S ISSUE 3: GARCO MET ITS EVIDENTIARY BURDEN 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. GARCO PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
JUDGMENT FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE. 
ROA argues the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding ROA acted with an 
impropei purpose or with impioper means [Appellee/s Buef p 22 32] ROA points to ROA's 
Octobei 1992 threat and ROA's actual location of its new sign in 1995 ROA ignores othei 
evidence ROA's footnote [Appellee's Bnet, p 26 7 fn 12] shows theie is ciedible evidence that 
another potential sign location exists south of Garco's property; that ROA's competitors are as free 
as ever to compete for a lease on that property; and that ROA's actions had no effect on ROA's 
actual ability to maximize its profits by restraining competition. When Garco asked ROA about 
the new sign, ROA told Garco it had located the new sign for the specific purpose to prevent Garco 
from doing business with anyone else [Fact 2] - in other words, ROA admitted it acted for a 
primary purpose of retaliating against Garco for its refusal to accede to ROA's demands. 
ROA's lengthy protestations to the contrary, Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982) and its progeny allow recovery even if the tort-feasor had a legitimate purpose, as long as 
his primary purpose was to cause injury. Whether ROA's primary purpose was to injure Garco is 
at least a fact question precluding summary judgment. 
ROA posts three possible scenarios to support its after-the-fact contention it was motivated 
solely by economic self interest: (a) ROA having two signs, one on the Mollerup property and one 
on Garco's; (b) ROA having the only sign in the area; and (c) a Reagan sign on the Mollerup 
property and a competitor's sign on Garco's. 
ROA had its scenario (a), and could have kept it, by honoring the agreement it reached with 
Garco in August of 1992 [Fact 11]. Unless the terms ROA obtained from Mollerup were 
negotiated freely at arms' length, and were substantially more favorable than those ROA had 
already reached (and then breached) with Garco, ROA's contention it acted primarily for its own 
economic interest lacks merit. Although ROA now argues it contracted with Mollerup "on 
acceptable terms" [Appellee's Brief p. 29], there is no evidence those terms were more favorable 
to ROA than the terms ROA had already reached with Garco in August of 1992. 
ROA's decision to deprive Garco of its ability to lease its property did not affect the ability 
of ROA's competitors to contract with Garco's southern neighbor, so the likelihood of achieving 
ROA's scenario (b) was not advanced by ROA's actions. 
As to scenario (c), ROA presented no evidence whatsoever that another sign on Garco's 
property would have any economic impact on ROA, making ROA's claim its actions were for its 
own economic benefit uncertain and questionable, and making summary judgment on that issue 
improper. There was at least a fact issue whether ROA's purpose to injure Garco predominated 
over any belated assertion of a lawful quest for profit. The trial court's decision to resolve those 
fact issues on summary judgment was reversible error. 
ROA argues the defendant in Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994) had no 
economic purpose. That case was reviewed under the standard of review for jury trials, not 
summary judgment. Prodata appealed a jury finding that it had acted to injure to its former 
employee, the same purpose Garco claims against ROA. The opinion reviewed the supporting 
evidence, viewing it in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, to determine whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the verdict. Even so, the opinion also points to evidence Prodata acted 
for an economic purpose to limit competition. Id. at 787. As in Pratt, that issue in this case turns 
on disputed facts that should have been resolved at trial. The trial court erred by weighing that 
evidence on summary judgment. 
ROA argues there is no evidence that ROA violated the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act and 
UDOT regulations and thereby employed improper means. [Appellee's Brief p. 30] ROA did not 
object to the UDOT records to which it refers in passing, and thereby waived any objections to 
their proffer. Those records support the facts as argued by Garco. The "evidence ... from the 
UDOT official" to which ROA refers was not from a UDOT official but from a former UDOT 
employee, was untimely filed, and confirmed the very UDOT documents ROA now argues were 
not before the court (although it attempted to "interpret" unambiguous entries so as to have those 
entries mean something entirely different from their actual meaning. Contrary to ROA's assertions, 
Garco set forth the facts, and arguments supported by record evidence, showing ROA's statutory 
violation [R386-388 (App 10 p 8-9)] ROA admits there is at least "some confusion about the 
process by which Reagan obtained its permit," in other words, there is necessarily at least a 
question of fact as to whether ROA employed improper means 
ROA's argument Garco did not explain how ROA's trespass prevented Garco from 
contracting with another outdoor advertiser is simply wrong [Brief of Appellee p 34] 
Garco offered evidence sufficient to support a finding that ROA engaged m a "contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce" 
forbidden by the Utah Antitrust Act U C A §76-10-914(1) This is the first time ROA has raised 
a "state action doctrine" in either state or federal court as a defense to Garco's state antitrust claim 
ROA should not be permitted to raise that defense for the first time on appeal Moreover, the 
"state action doctrine" was a judicially created exception to federal antitrust law, intended to protect 
sovereign states acting in their legislative capacities A state counterpart would be a 
"county/municipality action doctrine" immunizing actions otherwise violating state antitrust law, 
performed under county or city ordinances Since no county or city ordinances are at issue, such 
a doctrine would be no defense Even if the question is whether Utah should adopt the doctrine on 
a "state action" level, the record is inadequately developed for this court to determine if such a 
broad new exception to this state's antitrust laws should be adopted as the law of this state Such 
a rule involves public policy concerns best left to the legislature If this Court nevertheless 
considers such a rule, it should remand this case for an adequate record development of the factual 
and legal underpinnings needed to justify a "state action" exception to state antitrust law 
B. REAGAN CAN BE LIABLE IN TRESPASS FOR FAILURE TO REMOVE 
ITS FOUNDATION FROM THE PREMISES. 
Reagan argues the evidence and reasonable inferences are legally insufficient to support a 
claim for trespass [Appellee/s Bnef p 32-46] ROA's argument reduces to the following ROA 
had a lease with Garco's predecessor, which did not expressly require ROA to remove its structures 
or restore the premises at the end of the lease; ROA had no duties respecting the premises apart 
from express contractual duties spelled out in the lease; in the absence of such an express 
contractual obligation, ROA was free to leave the premises in whatever condition ROA wished at 
the end of the lease; and it is irrelevant whether the lease is unenforceable against Garco. 
ROA argues that "in the absence of a duty to remove the foundation, Reagan did not commit 
trespass by leaving in place the foundation ..." That argument begs the question. ROA's claimed 
lack of any such duty rests in the first instance on the enforceability of rights ROA claims under 
the lease. ROA's argument simply restates the position it advanced to the trial court. But absent 
express contractual rights to the contrary, ROA does have such a duty, imposed by common law 
as set forth in Garco's memoranda to the trial court. See R 196 (App. 4), p. 11-15; R 381 (App. 
10), p. 14-15; R 441 (App. 15), p. 2-5; R 466 (App. 17), p. 3-6, incorporated here by reference. 
Therefore, whether the lease was binding on Garco is very much relevant to what were ROA's 
duties to Garco. 
Garco's statement of Relevant Facts shows Garco had no record notice of the lease. The 
question regarding inquiry notice is what actual knowledge an inquiry would discover. A party can 
be charged with knowledge of a fact only if a reasonable inquiry would necessarily uncover that 
fact. Otherwise, a party could be charged with notice based on sheer speculation of possible 
disclosure rather than the likelihood of actual disclosure. Garco made inquiry of its predecessor, 
and received his files which contained no signed lease. Garco's predecessor also gave a written and 
notarized statement, in fulfillment of an express contractual obligation, wherein he warranted 
ROA's lease was on an unwritten month to month basis. Garco also had knowledge of other 
instances where ROA rented on such a basis. [Facts 1,4-7, 13] 
ROA's argument that "Garco never asked Reagan about the lease" is incomplete. Garco did 
inquire of Reagan after buying the premises. ROA's response to Garco's post-purchase contacts 
are at least some evidence, and are the only record evidence, as to what a pre-purchase inquiry 
would have disclosed. At a May 1991 meeting, in response to Garco's inquiry, ROA admitted it 
had no valid lease. A month later Garco notified ROA in writing there was no lease; ROA did not 
respond. In June through August of 1992 Garco and ROA were negotiating a written lease, which 
they would not have done had ROA produced an enforceable lease on better terms than were being 
negotiated. [Facts 8-11] At no time during these contacts did ROA assert the existence of a written 
lease. An earlier inquiry would not have led to a different result. ROA never claimed a pre-
purchase inquiry of ROA would necessarily have disclosed the existence of the lease. If ROA had 
made such a claim, it would have raised issues as to ROA's credibility precluding summary 
judgment in any case. The trial court's Order denying Garco's Motion to Revise amounted to a 
determination, in the face of evidence to the contrary, that a pre-purchase inquiry by Garco of 
Reagan would necessarily have disclosed the lease. That determination was reversible error. 
ROA contends Garco produced no evidence "to compare the rent that the lease required 
Reagan to pay to the amount of rent charged under similar leases for outdoor advertising signs on 
similar real property." [Appellee's Brief p. 45] ROA ignores the evidence that while the rate 
under the lease ROA relies on was $600 per year. [R 193 (App. 3)] ROA negotiated a lease with 
Garco for $7,800 per year. [Fact 11] A contract price one-thirteenth the fair market price is 
evidence of substantive unconsciounability. The lease document on its face provides additional 
evidence of unconscounability of terms, as Garco has already pointed out to this Court. 
ROA misconstrues the significance of the trial court's statement that it could not "rule as 
a matter of law that five years is a reasonable period for a restrictive covenant." That statement 
amounted to a ruling, as ROA admits, that there were factual issues preventing summary judgment 
on that question whether the lease was unconscionable. The trial court erred by entering its Order 
without resolving those issues. 
ROA sidesteps the procedural unconsciounability issue by focusing on selected indicia of 
unconsciounability to the exclusion of others. ROA's negotiation tactics with Garco are evidence 
of ROA's usual negotiation tactics. There is no evidence ROA employed different tactics with 
others. For purposes of summary judgment, the trial court was obliged to infer ROA's tactics with 
Garco were consistent with ROA's practices in general, and hence used in negotiating with Garco's 
predecessors. 
ROA's argument there is no evidence Garco's predecessors "did not wholly and completely 
agree to each and every term" is a red herring. It is a truism that for a claim for unconscounability 
can be made, there must be a contract at issue. The question is not whether the parties initially 
agreed, but the fairness of the procedure by which one party obtained the other's agreement. 
ROA argues "in the absence of an express covenant requiring a tenant to remove the 
improvements at the end of the lease, the law will simply not imply one ..., regardless of how such 
duty is characterized." ROA is wrong. As Garco's previous memoranda show, a lessee has duties 
beyond those expressly negotiated, including a duty not to commit waste, and a duty to vacate when 
the lease ends. Taking ROA's argument to its logical conclusion, if a lease does not expressly state 
a lessee cannot commit waste, the lessee is free to commit whatever waste it desires; if a lease does 
not expressly state a lessee must vacate the premises when the lease expires, the lessee is under no 
duty to vacate, and may continue to occupy the premises indefinitely (which is exactly what ROA 
is doing). Even to state the proposition demonstrates its fallacy. 
C. REAGAN CANNOT AVOID UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY DISCLAIMING 
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY IT IS POSSESSING IN FACT. 
Reagan argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support a claim for unlawful detainer. 
[Appellee/s Brief p. 46-47] ROA's argument it "had no obligation to remove any of its property 
at the termination of the lease, including the foundation" [Appellee's Brief p. 46], although an 
incorrect statement of Utah law, is an admission ROA continues to own the remains of its sign 
structure to this very day. 
The unlawful detainer statutes are intended to provide a summary remedy, not merely to 
resolve claims of rights to possession, but to restore possession in fact to the party entitled thereto. 
ROA argues it cannot be in unlawful detainer because it "claimed no right to possession after June 
1995." ROA's argument admits ROA had no right to possession after June 1995, but by continued 
ownership of the foundation which ROA left on the premises, remains in possession in fact of the 
premises. That is precisely what Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(1) defines as an unlawful detainer: a 
former tenant of real property who continues in possession after the expiration of the leasehold term 
and after receipt of the required notice to quit. 
A tenant does not end its possession by leaving its property on the premises while 
disclaiming a right to possession of the premises. ROA did not relinquish actual possession of the 
property, but only disclaimed any right to possession while remaining in actual possession by 
leaving its property on the premises. To avoid unlawful detainer ROA must actually cease to 
"continue in possession," by removing its property from the premises. Since ROA admits receiving 
the required statutory notice, admits continued ownership of its sign foundation, and admits its 
foundation remains on the premises, the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that ROA 
is not in unlawful detainer. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the trial court's orders dismissing Garco's Complaint, denying 
Garco's motion to revise the order dismissing the Complaint, and striking arguments supporting 
Garco's motion to revise should be reversed. This Court should remand the case to the trial court 
for entry of partial summary judgment in Garco's favor on the issues of ROA's liability for 
trespass, unlawful detainer and intentional interference, or alternatively remand this case for trial. 
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